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The Science of Mission Assurance
Abstract
The intent of this article is to describe—and prescribe—a scientific framework
for assuring mission essential functions in a contested cyber environment.
Such a framework has profound national security implications
as the American military increasingly depends on cyberspace to execute
critical mission sets. In setting forth this prescribed course of action, the
article will first decompose information systems into atomic processes
that manipulate information at all six phases of the information lifecycle,
then systematically define the mathematical rules that govern mission
assurance.
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Abstract
The intent of this article is to describe—and prescribe—a scientific framework for assuring mission essential functions in a contested cyber environment. Such a framework has profound national security implications
as the American military increasingly depends on cyberspace to execute
critical mission sets. In setting forth this prescribed course of action, the
article will first decompose information systems into atomic processes
that manipulate information at all six phases of the information lifecycle,
then systematically define the mathematical rules that govern mission
assurance.

Introduction
Perhaps more so than any of its peers worldwide, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) depends increasingly on cyberspace to execute critical
missions that are vital to maintaining American military superiority in the
traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space. As a result, the U.S. is
arguably more at risk to an asymmetric attack vector launched by an
adversary that cannot, or chooses not to, confront the U.S. in a conventional conflict. In the end, the military advantages that net-centricity provides the U.S. military concomitantly offer an adversary affordable attack
vectors through cyberspace against critical missions and advanced
weapon systems.
Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms,1 defines cyberspace as "a global domain within the information

Journal of Strategic Security
(c) 2011 ISSN: 1944-0464 eISSN: 1944-0472

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

61

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 2

Journal of Strategic Security

environment consisting of the interdependent network of information
technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers,"
and cyberspace operations as "the employment of cyber capabilities
where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or
through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid."
When the U.S. Air Force and the DoD formally identified cyberspace as a
legitimate war-fighting domain on par with land, sea, air, and space, the
attention focused initially on computer networks and the information that
traverses them, and the desire to deliver—and the imperative to defend
against—military effects in cyberspace. Recent studies by the Defense Science Board, as well as congressional and White House reports,2, 3 concurred on the urgent national need to shift the cybersecurity posture from
defending computer networks to assuring critical missions.

Mission Assurance
DoD Directive 3020.40 defines Mission Assurance (MA) as "a process to
ensure that assigned tasks or duties can be performed in accordance with
the intended purpose or plan.4 It is a summation of the activities and
measures taken to ensure that required capabilities and all supporting
infrastructures are available to the DoD to carry out the National Military
Strategy." In accordance with this directive, a principal responsibility of a
commander is to assure mission execution in a timely manner. The reliance of a Mission Essential Function (MEF) on cyberspace makes cyberspace a center of gravity an adversary may exploit and, in doing so,
enable that adversary to directly engage the MEF without the employment of conventional forces or weapons.
For the operational purposes of mission assurance, cyberspace operations
occur when a signal affects an intelligent system. In this definition,
• Intelligent system refers to a stored-program computer—any central
processing unit (CPU) that executes a sequence of instructions
• Signal refers to an information-modulated waveform
Thus, a cyber operation occurs every time an external signal modifies the
flow of control or information in an intelligent system.
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This article proposes adopting the operational definition of a cyber process as a program executing in an intelligent system. This definition provides a foundation for mission assurance in a contested environment.
Using intelligent systems as building blocks, we can decompose a mission
into logically interconnected components of intelligent systems.
We characterize missions by the security attributes of the execution environments of their cyber processes and their communication processes.
Mission criticality and prioritization dictate the level of granularity of the
decomposition of a mission into cyber processes. This decomposition permits measuring the assurance of a mission as a function of its constituent
components.
Mission assurance can focus on each cyber process and its interactions
with internal and external processes as having potential vulnerabilities to
external signals. Thus, the elemental activity of information communication among processes provides a focal analysis point for both specification
and implementation vulnerabilities.
Decomposing a mission into its atomic cyber processes provides the
means for specifying operational mitigation measures through the imposition of security attributes on these processes and their inter-process
interactions. An atomic cyber process refers to the lowest architectural
level at which a system generates, processes, stores, or transmits data.
Security attributes include the fundamental information assurance (IA)
tenets of confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and attribution, as well as state-of-the-practice provision of these tenets through
cryptography, diversity, agility, and trust.

Principles of War in the Cyber Domain
This section introduces warfare in the cyber domain, identifies the weaknesses of the traditional approach to building reliable systems, and leads
to an alternative approach that seeks to build secure systems.
Engineering focuses traditionally on designing, developing, building, testing, and deploying complex systems that operate reliably in a permissive
environment, but fail catastrophically in a contested environment. Mistaking reliability for security characterizes a generation of military, industrial, and financial systems that make little to no provision for functional
vulnerability to cross-domain cyber threats.
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Rule 1 – Reliability does not equal security.
In this context, cybersecurity focuses disproportionately on threats—
hackers, criminals, terrorists, and states—instead of system vulnerabilities. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines
risk to information systems as "a function of the likelihood of a given
threat-source exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the
resulting impact of that adverse event" and a threat as "the potential for a
particular threat-source to successfully exercise a particular vulnerability."5 Threat and vulnerability are dependent variables in the NIST definition; thus a threat requires the existence of a vulnerability to exploit.
Rule 2 – There is no threat without vulnerability.
Cryptography enables the Information Assurance attributes of confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and attribution as they apply
to information at rest or in motion. For the purpose of MA, we further
break down the states of information.
Rule 3 – An information system acts on information at one or more
stages of the information lifecycle:
1. Information generation
2. Information processing
3. Information storage
4. Information communication
5. Information consumption
6. Information destruction
To permit functional representation of relationships among processes
within a mission, we define a hierarchy whereby a mission consists of
functions, a function consists of systems, a system consists of subsystems,
a subsystem consists of components, and a component consists of indivisible atomic nodes. The number of layers in a decomposition—set arbitrarily at six—and the granularity of abstraction depend on the mission at
hand. However, the two ends of the spectrum present bookends to the
decomposition.
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Rule 4 – A critical function—and for that matter a system or a subsystem—consists of a set of cooperating processes executing on atomic
cyber nodes that generate, process, store, communicate, consume, or
destroy information.
Corollary – Every atomic cyber process belongs to a function.
Mission dependence on cyberspace consists of the dependence on atomic
cyber nodes within the mission, the internal interactions among these
nodes, and their external interactions with the outside world. The hierarchical mission decomposition outlined above exhibits certain fractal
properties. Provable properties between a system and its subsystems are
also provable between a mission and its functions, a function and its systems, a subsystem and its components, and a component and its nodes.
Rule 5 – If a system generates information, then at least one of its subsystems generates information.
Corollary – If no subsystem generates information, then the parent system does not generate information.
Rule 5 and its corollary apply equally to information processing, storage,
consumption, and destruction. For the purpose of this decomposition, an
Input / Output (IO) communication node is bidirectional if it is capable of
both information transmission and reception.
Rule 6 – If a system transmits or receives information, then at least one
of its subsystems transmits or receives information.
Corollary – The fact that a subsystem transmits or receives information
is not sufficient to conclude that the parent system transmits or receives
information.
Rule 7 – Information exchange between systems occurs through paired
transmit-receive IO nodes.
Rule 8 – An external threat exercises an internal vulnerability only
through an IO node.
Rules 6–8 permit focusing vulnerability mitigation on external transmit
nodes. Thus, a system without an external IO node does not present a vulnerability to external threats.
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Rule 9 – An internal threat at a higher layer becomes an external threat
at a lower layer.
This rule offers a new way to address the insider threat to a system, reducing it to an external threat against an IO node in a vulnerable subsystem.
Rule 10 – A vulnerability in a subsystem becomes a vulnerability in a
parent system if and only if the IO node in the subsystem is an external
IO node in the parent system.
This rule allows limiting the impact of a weak link on a system by isolating
the vulnerabilities of the weak link from potential threats in the outside
world. The vulnerability extends to multiple missions that share a common function, system, subsystem, component, or node; and multiple
functions and systems may share a component or node.
Rule 11 – A vulnerable system supporting two functions renders both
functions vulnerable if and only if the vulnerable system contains an IO
node that connects one of the functions to an external system.
The success of a cyberattack that follows the kill chain of a traditional
kinetic operation—consisting of the distinct steps of Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess (F2T2EA)—requires information resources at the target system, including process, store, and IO nodes, for each step of the kill
chain. This provides an effective defensive strategy against this class of
cyberattacks.
Rule 12 – Breaking the threat kill-chain at any phase of F2T2EA denies
threat success.
Corollary – Assuring the kill chain of a friendly cyberattack requires
assuring the information lifecycle at all phases of the F2T2EA.

Mission Assurance End Game
The ultimate goal of mission assurance is to develop an engineering culture that mathematically represents the specifications of a critical MEF
and verifies its implementation. Representing a MEF as a fractal system
of cyber systems with the help of queuing theory provides a tool for reasoning on security properties and proving certain relationships among
vulnerabilities and threats.
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Traditional formal verification suffers from state-space explosion as soon
as the size of the system under consideration exceeds trivial classroom
examples. Conversely, a fractal approach to MA avoids state-space explosion by sidestepping discrete simulations in favor of analytical estimation.
IBM's Research Queuing RESQ package achieved similar efficiency by
representing communications networks as queuing systems rather than
discrete systems.6
While availability and mean time between failures (MTBF) provide useful
metrics to estimate the reliability of complex systems of physical components, mission assurance requires different metrics. The intertwined
properties of vulnerability and threat offer an unbounded continuum
across which to measure mission assurance in terms of cost, transforming
MA metrics into the economics of security.
Rule 13 – MA relates (1) the cost of securing a MEF and (2) the consequence of security failure to (3) the cost to a threat intent on exploiting
the MEF and (4) the benefit to a successful threat.
The cost of security as a metric applies equally to future systems and
existing systems. For the latter, MA relates the cost of vulnerability mitigation to the cost of threat success and the consequences in the cost of a
failed mission.
The secure engineering practices proposed above hold promise for future
system design, yet offer little relief to legacy systems. The next section of
this paper presents stopgap measures to assure existing systems in a contested cyber environment.

Methodology
Mission assurance in a contested cyber domain requires a four-step process: (1) prioritization, (2) mapping, (3) vulnerability assessment, and (4)
mitigation:
1. Prioritization: Develop a list of MEFs, and prioritize them with respect
to the overall mission of a command. For those MEFs deemed critical,
systematic cyber mitigation must follow the steps below. This prioritization step belongs to the mission commander and relies primarily on
the domain experts who own the mission.
2. Mission mapping: Decompose each critical MEF into a number of layers that represent sub-functions, relationships, responsibilities, and
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systems, culminating in a logical representation of the atomic cyber
processes that enable the MEF. Mission mapping requires collaboration between mission owners and cyber advisors. The fidelity of the
mapping depends primarily on the criticality of the MEF in question.
3. Vulnerability assessment: Through a tabletop war game by a combined
blue team of cyber experts and mission domain experts, conduct a systematic assessment of MEF susceptibility to process failures, and the
vulnerability of both atomic cyber processes and inter-process communication to accidents and attacks. The success of this step requires a
current understanding of the cyber threats capable of exploiting identified vulnerabilities.
4. Mitigation: Develop operational measures to mitigate the vulnerabilities identified in Step 3. Specify these measures as security attributes
applicable to the atomic cyber processes and the inter-process communications among them.
5. Red teaming (optional): An optional fifth step in this process brings in
an external red team of cyber aggressors to test the effectiveness of the
mitigation measures.
The evolution of the cyber threat landscape dictates conducting this MA
process at all stages of weapon-system development. In the notional timeline of the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Life
Cycle Management System,7 conduct MA analysis at the Material Solution
Analysis Phase (Milestone A), Technology Development Phase (Milestone
B), Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase (Milestone C),
Production and Deployment Phase (Initial Operating Condition), and
Operations and Support Phase (Full Operating Condition.)

Prioritization
The prioritization step belongs to the mission commander and deals with
identifying and prioritizing the critical functions, scoping the mission
mapping activity, and establishing boundaries. MEF prioritization is fundamentally a non-cyber process and includes:
• Defining explicitly the scope of the study by enumerating the MEFs of
interest
• Specifying the interfaces of the MEFs to their surroundings and the
external world
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• Prioritizing the MEFs as an initial assessment of acceptable risk
• Understanding the priorities of the mission commander permits the
cyber engineer to estimate the granularity of the cyber mapping as a
function of MEF criticality

Mission Mapping
Mapping mission dependence in cyberspace requires identifying the
atomic cyber processes that make up the mission. Mission mapping
includes the following steps:
• Decompose the mission into its constituent components.
• Identify all the stored-program processors in an MEF in the atomic
cyber processes
• Identify the make and model of each processor, the fabrication technology, clock speed, storage architecture, amount of cache and primary
storage, and input/output devices.
• Define the function of each processor—sensing, computing, storing, or
transmitting data.
• Identify all data storage components within an MEF.
• Identify all data communication among cyber processes, and between
the MEF and the outside world.
• List all the architectural layers that each processor implements.
• List all the programs that the processor executes at each layer.
• Characterize non-volatile storage in terms of pedigree, technology, and
capacity.
• Document the data format, speed, and protocol for each data communication process.

Vulnerability Assessment
Mapping mission dependence on cyberspace generates a detailed diagram
of the functionality of each atomic cyber process and the interaction
among connected processes. This diagram facilitates and enables educated and informed cyber experts to conduct a meaningful and realistic
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tabletop blue team vulnerability assessment for each process based on
known threats. The ultimate goal is to provide a quantitative risk assessment of each process and to use these assessments to compute an overall
mission assurance. Vulnerability assessment includes the following steps:
• For each sensor, assess its potential malicious use as an entry vector
into the system.
• For each processing unit, estimate the risk based on the software it executes and the documented vulnerabilities and threats.
• For each storage unit, estimate the vulnerabilities and threats.
• For each data communication channel, estimate the threats to protocol
and implementation vulnerabilities.
• For each vulnerability, define its temporal and spatial properties and
estimate their effects.
• Where feasible, combine into a larger cyber process those adjacent
atomic cyber processes that share storage or communication resources.
• Compute an overall mission assurance metric as a measure of MEF
susceptibility to cyber threats and as an input to inform a mission commander about risk management.

Threat Mitigation
Mitigation strategies focus on those atomic cyber processes, sensors, storage units, and inter-process communications that present the largest vulnerability surface for unintended cyber incidents and malicious cyber
attacks. Mitigation strategies include measures to reduce the exposure to,
and impact of, a cyber compromise, such as:
• Defensive posture realignment from intrusion detection to threat
denial
• Physical and logical system isolation
• Virtualization and MEF recomposition
• Static threat avoidance by moving vulnerabilities out of band through
system redesign
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• Domain modification through protocol flattening, just-in-time implementation, and hardware-software tradeoffs
• Polymorphism through protocol and implementation modification
• Agility for real-time dynamic threat avoidance
• Hardening of the information assurance attribute of confidentiality
through encryption
• Application of authentication measures
• Redundancy and artificial diversity to protect against monoculture vulnerability
• Compilation into hardware-critical software segments to protect
against modification
• Selective insertion of Government Off The Shelf (GOTS) technology
into Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) systems to harden against common threats

Red Teaming (Optional)
The utility of red teaming is limited by the ability of the red team to accurately replicate the adversarial threat to a given mission. Aggressors have
traditionally employed a three-step strategy that has been consistently
effective over time, but has yet to be proven in the cyber domain. This
strategy involves the following:
• Understand the threat
• Replicate the threat
• Exercise the threat
While this strategy works well against poorly-protected computer
networks, it falls short in assessing the vulnerability of a critical MEF to
cyberattack for two key reasons. First, aggressors have little
documentation of threats against DoD MEFs that they can understand, let
alone replicate and exercise. Second, aggressors typically lack domain
expertise in specific MEFs, making their network attacks inconsequential
to MEF execution.
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This optional step of red teaming serves to satisfy the misplaced belief in
the usefulness of red team assessment of mission assurance. While red
teaming has no drawbacks, its contribution remains inherently limited.
The failure to compromise a system may be evidence of red team inexperience, not system resilience. We must not confuse the absence of evidence of vulnerability as evidence of the absence of vulnerability.

Multidimensional Dependencies
We have so far outlined in this article a methodology to map the dependence of MEFs on the underlying cyber infrastructure. Static mapping
assumes that MEF dependence on cyber remains constant in time and
location. This section examines MEF temporal and spatial dependencies.
Short-term temporal changes in mission assurance can occur in the normal course of mission execution. These changes occur when mission execution transitions among processes with different vulnerabilities. Longterm trends affecting mission assurance result from technology obsolescence, vulnerability discovery, and threat evolution. Long-term trends
necessitate the reassessment of mission assurance on a periodic basis,
especially over the lifecycle development of a weapon system.
Spatial dependencies occur when a system encounters different threats
based on their geographic location. Kinetic threats unfold in a substantially different extent on a battlefield than in a home-base environment.
Similarly, certain systems may encounter location-specific cyber threats
that dictate a recomputation of mission assurance on a regional basis.
The granularity of the mission mapping may affect the fidelity of the mission assurance estimate. Too coarse a system-level decomposition may
overlook device-level vulnerabilities. Too fine a device-level decomposition may miss system-level dependencies.

Conclusion
This article explored the critical vulnerability facing the Department of
Defense, namely the dependence of critical MEFs on a contested cyberspace. Additionally, the article described the cyber environment, identified a method to catalog cyber vulnerabilities that may provide attack
vectors against MEFs, and outlined a methodology to assure these MEFs
in a contested cyber environment. The prescription for DoD MEF assurance laid out a series of steps, starting with prioritizing missions, mapping their dependence on the cyber domain, identifying vulnerabilities,
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and mitigating these vulnerabilities. Finally, it offered a set of rules to
guide the design of future systems, as well as a stopgap approach for
assuring legacy systems.
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